Binish Thomas (Special Correspondent)
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a defence agreement in Mecca that was immediately described by many observers as an “Islamic NATO”.
Its central promise was dramatic: an armed attack on one member would be regarded as an attack on all three.
Barely a month later, that promise is facing its first serious test.
Iran-aligned Houthi forces have seized the strategic Yemeni port of Mokha and advanced towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
They have also launched missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, injuring civilians and threatening critical infrastructure.
Yet Pakistan has publicly acknowledged that no military response under the Mecca agreement is currently being discussed.
This raises a difficult question for Riyadh: Was Saudi Arabia misled by Pakistan and Turkey, or did it simply overestimate what its new allies were prepared to do?
The Promise of an “Islamic NATO”:
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement brought together three of the region’s most significant military powers.
Saudi Arabia provides enormous financial resources and advanced Western-supplied weaponry. Pakistan possesses one of the largest standing militaries in the Muslim world and is a nuclear-armed state.
Turkey has a powerful military, a rapidly expanding defence industry and extensive experience in drone warfare.
On paper, the combination is formidable:
The agreement states that an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all. It also envisages closer military coordination, joint exercises, defence-industry cooperation and mechanisms for collective deterrence.
But there is an important distinction between signing a collective-defence agreement and creating an organisation capable of immediately fighting a war.
NATO has decades of integrated command structures, operational planning and institutional experience. The Mecca alliance is still building its mechanisms.
At the end of August, the three countries were only beginning to institutionalise the agreement and establish a permanent secretariat.
That difference has become crucial.
The Houthis Deliver the First Test
The timing could hardly be more uncomfortable.
The Houthis have moved beyond their traditional strongholds in northern Yemen and pushed along the country’s Red Sea coast.
The capture of Mokha has brought them much closer to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
The strategic implications are enormous. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and is vital for shipping between Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Any prolonged disruption threatens global trade and energy supplies.
The Houthis have also declared a blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping and intensified attacks on Saudi territory.
Reuters reported that the group had reached the Hanish islands after capturing Mokha, putting further pressure on the maritime route.
This is not a theoretical security problem for Saudi Arabia anymore. The missiles are already flying.
Where Are Pakistan and Turkey?:
This is where the “Islamic NATO” narrative begins to look complicated.
On September 9, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that continued Houthi attacks or spillover into Saudi Arabia could activate the Mecca agreement and that Pakistan would honour its commitments if required.
But the very next day, Pakistan’s Foreign Office clarified that no military response was currently being discussed. Pakistan’s message was essentially that it remains committed to the pact but will act “when the time comes”.
For Saudi Arabia, that distinction matters enormously. An alliance designed to provide collective defence is ultimately judged not by its signing ceremony, but by what happens when one member is actually attacked.
Turkey, meanwhile, has not committed troops to the Yemen conflict either.
This does not mean that the pact has failed. It is still a new alliance and its members may eventually decide to act. But the first crisis has exposed the difference between political solidarity and automatic military intervention.
Why Pakistan Is Hesitating:
Pakistan’s reluctance should not come as a complete surprise. Islamabad has historically maintained close military relations with Saudi Arabia, but it has also been cautious about becoming directly involved in the Yemen war.
Pakistan faces its own security pressures and has important relations with Iran. Direct military action against the Houthis could therefore transform Pakistan from a diplomatic player into a direct participant in a much wider regional conflict.
That is a very different proposition from signing a defence agreement. Pakistan can promise to defend Saudi Arabia without necessarily wanting to fight a long and expensive war in Yemen.
And Saudi Arabia may now be discovering the difference.
The Israel Irony:
The most ironic development in this entire episode is what Riyadh reportedly did next.
The Jerusalem Post reported on September 15 that Saudi Arabia and Israel held talks mediated by the U.S. Central Command, with Riyadh seeking Israeli intelligence assistance to defend itself against the Houthi threat.
Israel Hayom reported a similar development, saying that Saudi Arabia had turned towards Israel for assistance as Washington weighed its own response to the Houthi escalation.
The reported Israeli assistance is primarily about intelligence: understanding Houthi deployments, capabilities and possible future operations.
That is significant because Israel has spent years developing sophisticated intelligence and surveillance capabilities against Iranian-backed groups across the region.
The irony is difficult to miss:
Saudi Arabia had just created a defence partnership with Pakistan and Turkey partly to strengthen its regional security architecture.
Yet when the Houthi threat intensified, Riyadh reportedly sought intelligence assistance from Israel.
This does not mean Saudi Arabia has abandoned Pakistan or Turkey. Nor does it mean that Riyadh and Jerusalem are suddenly formal military allies.
But it demonstrates an important reality of modern warfare: when a crisis arrives, countries turn to whoever possesses the capabilities they need, not necessarily whoever signed the most impressive agreement with them.
The Real Lesson for Riyadh:
Saudi Arabia’s strategic dilemma goes beyond Pakistan and Turkey.
The kingdom wants greater strategic autonomy. It does not want its security to depend entirely on Washington or any single external power.
The Mecca agreement was therefore an important political statement: Muslim-majority powers can build their own security architecture.
But the first major crisis has produced an uncomfortable contradiction.
The alliance that was presented as an “Islamic NATO” has not yet demonstrated a NATO-style military response.Pakistan is urging caution and diplomacy.
Turkey remains outside direct military involvement. And Saudi Arabia is reportedly looking to Israel and Western partners for intelligence and other forms of assistance.
That does not prove that the alliance has failed. But it does prove that an alliance on paper and an alliance on the battlefield are two very different things.
The Houthis Have Asked the Question. Now the Allies Must Answer.
The Houthi advance has created a crisis that Saudi Arabia cannot afford to ignore.
Mokha, the Hanish islands and the approach to Bab el-Mandeb give the Houthis increasing leverage over a maritime corridor vital to global trade and Saudi energy exports.
At the same time, attacks on Saudi territory demonstrate that the conflict can no longer be contained within Yemen.
For Mohammed bin Salman, the question is therefore no longer about diplomatic symbolism. It is about whether the partners who promised collective defence will actually stand beside Saudi Arabia when the cost of doing so becomes real.
Saudi Arabia may not have been “tricked” by Pakistan and Turkey.
It may simply have learned a much harder lesson: Friends can sign an agreement with you. Allies prove themselves when the missiles arrive.
